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Exit is a ubiquitous feature of life, whether breaking up in a marriage,
dropping a college course, or pulling out of a venture capital investment. In fact,
our exit options often determine whether and how we enter in the first place.
While legal scholarship is replete with studies of exit strategies for businesses
and individuals, administrative law scholarship has barely touched the topic
of exit. Yet exit plays just as central a role in the regulatory state as elsewhere–
–welfare support ends, government steps out of rate-setting. In this Article, we
argue that exit is a fundamental feature of regulatory design and should be
explicitly considered at the time of program creation.
Part II starts from first principles and sets out the basic features of
regulatory exit. It addresses the design challenges of exit strategies and how to
measure success of exit. With these descriptive and normative foundations in
place, Part III develops a framework that explains the four basic types of
regulatory exit strategies, exploring the political economy that determines each
strategy and explaining when policy makers are most likely to adopt them. To
demonstrate its usefulness in practice, the framework is applied as a case study
in Part IV to the emerging challenge of fracking. We conclude by describing a
new exit strategy model for regulatory design, a hybrid approach of “Lookback
Exit.”
Exit is a vast, central, yet largely unexplored aspect of administrative
governance. By providing a fuller account, we demonstrate why exit warrants
focused research and theoretical development in its own right, create a
framework for the analysis of exit issues, and identify the key questions for
future research. Doing so provides important insights, not only for
understanding the practice we see around us today, but also for the design of
programs to manage emerging issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a way to get out of almost every relationship in modern
society—married couples can divorce, partnerships can dissolve,
students can drop courses, banks can foreclose on loans, and
universities can quit athletic conferences. While people might not like
to admit it, the fact that there are structured processes available to exit
relationships strongly influences the way we enter relationships. The
prenuptial agreement is a classic example, serving as a pre-planned
roadmap in the event of future marital dissolution, as is the agreement
venture capital firms sign before investing in start-ups.1 The reality is
that a wide variety of relationships only get started because one or more
1.
See Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49
STAN. L. REV. 887, 890–92 (1997). Exit strategies are so important for venture capital firms that
the topic is taught in business schools. Xu Han, Visiting Lecturer, The Univ. of Penn., The Wharton
Sch. Mgmt. Dept., Venture Capital and Entrepreneurial Management, (Fall 2013) (class on
“Managing the Exit: IPO and alternative exit strategies”); Lena G. Goldberg, Senior Lecturer,
Harvard Bus. Sch. MBA Program, Syllabus for Legal Aspects of Entrepreneurship, (course content
includes surveying legal aspects of exit strategies, including PE exits).
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of the parties devised an “exit strategy” before entering the
relationship.2
Exit is also a ubiquitous, inevitable feature of governance, and
its challenges arise in a wider range of government activities than is
commonly recognized. For welfare payments, when should particular
recipients be deemed no longer eligible for public assistance? For voting
rights, when should a district under federal supervision be excused
from oversight? For energy production, when should government
withdraw from electricity rate-setting? The list goes on and on—from
deciding when to end pollution restrictions to shutting down a crop
subsidy program. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that exit is
ubiquitous in the background of the administrative state. The question
is whether it should feature more prominently in the foreground.
In some cases, of course, government exit strategies are closely
scrutinized. For example, seeking to prevent the demise of one of
America’s largest and most iconic corporations, in 2008 and 2009 the
federal government provided nearly $50 billion to General Motors,
taking a majority share in Detroit’s largest automobile company.3 The
government also provided similarly extensive support to the insurance
giant AIG and the “too big to fail” banks.4 At the time of the bailouts,
newspapers and talk shows were abuzz with earnest debate over the
government’s exit strategy.5 How would the government be able to get
out of its financial entanglement? As one blogger commented at the
time, “Our current government will have that problem when they
finally have to decide what to do with the multitude of bailouts that are

2.
Searching for the term “exit strategy” in Westlaw’s Law Reviews and Journals database
yields over 1,500 documents, the vast majority of which deal with exit strategies in business and
financial settings.
3.
Tim Higgins, Ian Katz & Kasia Klimasinka, GM Bailout Ends as U.S. Sells Last of
‘Government Motors’, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-12-09/gm-bailout-ends-as-u-s-sells-last-of-government-motors-.html [http://perma.cc/L5KN2XTE].
4.
Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html
[http://perma.cc/7WM4-RDTH]; Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E.
Hilsenrath, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit
Dries Up, WALL STREET J., (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB122156561931242905 [http:// perma.cc/AB75-HH2B] (“The Fed will lend up to $85 billion to
AIG, and the U.S. government will effectively get a 79.9% equity stake”).
5.
See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT
ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 196–222 (June 10, 2010) (discussing options
the government did and could still consider for terminating support for AIG and requiring AIG’s
repayment of federal funds).
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ongoing. . . . [W]e will eventually need an ‘exit strategy’; and we may
find that Iraq was easier to leave.”6
The public discussions over an exit strategy prior to bailing out
General Motors or invading Iraq seemed natural and necessary at the
time.7 Nobody hoped for permanence in either case, so it was reasonable
to ask the government to plan for exit at the outset. Surprisingly,
though, similar concerns are largely absent in the administrative
context.
Before launching a new regulatory or entitlements program,
which in effect establishes a new relationship between government and
the regulated or benefited entities, does anyone ask about the
government’s exit strategy? More to the point, should the government
devise explicit, deliberate exit strategies for regulatory and
entitlements programs? If so, what makes for an effective exit strategy?
These may seem to be obvious questions, but they are rarely asked.8
Traditional regulatory design asks how government should enter
a regulatory space and design regulations to accomplish Goal X in a way
that is efficient, effective, and equitable.9 We argue that this is only half
6.
Bailout Exit Strategy?, NEOAVATARA (Apr. 16, 2009), http://neoavatara.com/blog/
?p=3001 [http://perma.cc/JNU6-C37H]. Speaking of Iraq, many commentators questioned at the
time of the invasion whether the United States had a coherent exit strategy.
7.
See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of United States Foreign Policy:
Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 149 (2004) (discussing the Iraq war exit
strategy).
8.
In a fascinating exception at the founding of the country, Thomas Jefferson
recommended that the Constitution should be rewritten every generation. Through this forced
exit, governance would regularly be re-examined and renewed. As he wrote to James Madison,
Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of nineteen years.
If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right. It may be said, that the
succeeding generation exercising, in fact, the power of repeal, this leaves them as free
as if the constitution or law had been expressly limited to nineteen years only. In the
first place, this objection admits the right, in proposing an equivalent. But the power of
repeal is not an equivalent. It might be, indeed, if every form of government were so
perfectly contrived, that the will of the majority could always be obtained, fairly and
without impediment. But this is true of no form. The people cannot assemble
themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious. Various checks are opposed to
every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of the public councils, bribery
corrupts them, personal interests lead them astray from the general interests of their
constituents; and other impediments arise, so as to prove to every practical man, that
a law of limited duration is much more manageable than one which needs a repeal.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (1789). ME 7:459, Papers 15:396.
9.
President Obama recently summarized the conventional regulatory design process,
explaining that
each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits
and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden
on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into account, among
other things, and to the extent practicable, the costs of cumulative regulations; (3)
select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that
maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public health and
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the task. Government should also ask how it will exit when it realizes
it (1) has accomplished Goal X, (2) is not achieving Goal X, or (3) has
regulated more than necessary to achieve Goal X.
Asking about exit is thus a key first step, but only the first, for
the design of exit strategies presents other difficult challenges.
Premature exit may negate the benefits gained from intervention in the
first place or even make matters worse. The bird delisted too soon from
the Endangered Species Act may still need protection and be pushed
closer to extinction as a result. On the other hand, making exit too
difficult might lead to locking-in of benefits for some interests, including
the relevant agency and vested parties. This creates an effectively
permanent relationship of dependence, often in the form of subsidy or
shielding from competition. Just try terminating grazing allotments on
federal public lands in the West.10 Consequently, exit strategies need to
address both of these concerns directly.
Even more important, as the field of law and economics has
amply demonstrated, legal design influences behavior. Exit strategies
are fundamental to what happens on the ground. It is often the case,
though, that exit either is not contemplated beforehand or proves far
more difficult than planned.11 In short, exit poses both a pervasive and
complex challenge for the administrative state.
This Article is the first to consider comprehensively the theory
and practice of government exit. To be sure, many legal scholars have
examined instances of exit in particular regulatory or entitlements
programs.12 However, none has identified or explored the more general
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity); (4) to the extent
feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner
of compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and (5) identify and assess available
alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage
the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information
upon which choices can be made by the public.
Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
10. See Bruce Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 991,
1005 (2014) (describing how grazing allotments, which are supposed to have defined terms, have
become so entrenched as to be essentially perpetual).
11. To be sure, deregulation can be a kind of exit strategy for the administrative state, but
it is a blunt and awkward instrument. See CASS SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER 177–89 (2013) (discussing the
Obama Administration’s deregulation initiative). As we show, deregulation is only one type of exit
and more usually is simply the result of having no exit strategy. The cycle of regulation,
deregulation, and reregulation is usually the product of political dynamics, not of a purposive exit
strategy. Recently, for example, Congress intervened to legislate the removal of endangered
species protections for gray wolves in several states after protracted administrative and judicial
proceedings had stalled the delisting process. See generally Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild
Rockies v. Salazar: Congress Behaving Badly, 25 VILLA. ENVTL. L.J. 351 (2014) (providing the full
history of the congressionally-mandated delisting).
12. See generally David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 265 (2013) (examining numerous regulatory programs that allow the agency to waive a
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phenomenon of exit strategies in administrative practice and policy.13
Focusing on exit reveals foundational questions not usually asked in
administrative law scholarship: What is the range of exit strategies?
Which are most appropriate for promoting certain behaviors of public
and private actors? Which are most appropriate for preventing perverse
behaviors? Nor are these just of theoretical interest. A deeper
understanding of exit helps explain the shape administrative programs
can and should take. As we demonstrate at the end of the Article, the
regulation of fracking and climate change both present current,
contentious issues that would benefit from more careful consideration
of exit strategies.
In Part II, we start from first principles and consider the basic
features of exit. In separate sections, we explore the What, Who, When,
Where, How, and Why of exit, identifying the key facets of exit in its
many manifestations. We then address the normative aspect of exit
strategies, exploring the different metrics one might use to measure
success. With these descriptive and normative foundations in place,
Part III turns to design, developing a typology of the different exit
strategies for government and regulated/beneficiary parties. Drawing
from concrete examples, we create a matrix framework for describing
basic categories of exit and explore the political economy behind the
groupings of exit strategies in the matrix boxes.

mandatory requirement); Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Electric Deregulation after California: Down
but Not Out, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (2002) (discussing the California electric deregulation event,
which infamously failed); Steven Ferry, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally
Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2002) (discussing
“exit fees” as part of an exit strategy for moving industry and consumers toward renewable energy);
Ron Haskins, What Works is Work: Welfare Reform and Poverty Reduction, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL.
30 (2009) (reviewing the techniques and impacts of “workfare” welfare reform of the 1990s). Most
of the exit-oriented work in regulatory contexts focused on the deregulation movement of the 1990s
and subsequent reregulation movements. See generally Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of
the Impact of Reregulation and Deregulation on Selected Industries and Sectors, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
461 (1995) (symposium issue covering deregulation in the energy, trucking, communications, food,
financial, and other industries). Deregulation, which presents a host of political and governance
issues, is in our view only one form of regulatory exit.
13. In her work examining how to design regulation ex ante to accommodate growth in scale,
measured in terms of number of sources of harm being regulated, Professor Hannah Wiseman
recognizes the possibility of “ratcheting down regulation when it appears that the activity produces
fewer harms as it grows” and kindly acknowledges an early draft of this Article as expanding on
that theme. Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV.
235, 238 n.2, 303 (2014). Her work “focus[es] on the growth of harms in a negative direction[—
]when society might have inadequate opportunities to bargain for harm reduction and regulation
does not change.” Id. at 238. Nevertheless, several of the mechanisms she describes for allowing
regulation to more or less automatically ratchet up as harms increase when scale grows can also
work in the other direction as harms decrease, and thus would qualify for our purposes as exit
strategies.
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Despite the breadth and endless number of exit examples, our
simple model explains why we see particular types of exit strategies in
certain settings and not others. In Part IV, we apply the framework to
the case studies of climate change and the emerging regulatory
challenge of fracking to demonstrate its usefulness in practice. After
proposing a set of guidelines for policy makers to use in their choice of
exit strategy in the program design phase, we conclude by describing a
new exit strategy model: a hybrid approach we call “Lookback Exit.”14
Exit is a vast and central, yet largely unexplored aspect of
governance. By providing the first full account, we demonstrate why
exit warrants focused research and theory in its own right, create a
framework for the analysis of exit issues, and identify the key questions
for future research. Doing so provides important insights not only into
the administrative practice we see around us today, but also for the
design of new programs to manage emerging issues. Thinking clearly
about exit before entering a relationship is important to people in
settings as varied as college course loads and as sophisticated as
venture capital investing. It is long past the time for government to
think clearly about it, too.
II. DEFINING EXIT
This Section systematically explores the key attributes of
regulatory exit strategies. Because this is the first article to treat exit
as a complex, dynamic phenomenon, we lay a foundation by setting out
in clear fashion the What, Who, When, Where, How, and Why of exit in
the administrative state. We then step back to consider how one should
evaluate the success of an exit strategy.
A. Key Attributes of Exit
1. What is exit?
For a phenomenon as widespread in the administrative state as
exit, a useful definition must be broad enough to encompass exit’s many
14. As the name suggests, our proposal builds off the Obama Administration’s term for
retrospective regulatory review, Lookback Regulation, under which “agencies shall consider how
best to promote retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with
what has been learned.” Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). For descriptions
of Regulatory Lookback and previous administrations’ retrospective regulatory review initiatives,
see Reeve Bull, Building a Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking
Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265, 277–86 (2015); Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with
Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 57, 58–59 (2013).

1302

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:5:1295

manifestations, yet sufficiently precise to differentiate exit from other
mechanisms of administrative process and policy. We define exit as the
intentional, significant reduction in governmental intervention initiated
at a particular time under specified processes and conditions. This
definition includes actions ranging from welfare reform to electricity
deregulation. As we describe below, different parties can initiate exit in
a variety of governance contexts, and exit strategies have temporal,
procedural, and substantive dimensions.
2. Who exits?
At its most basic level, exit can take two very different forms,
presenting opposite sides of the same coin. On the face side, we are all
familiar with the notion of government eliminating a program through
blunt deregulation. When the government shuts down an electric utility
rate-setting program, for example, it exits this domain, leaving
electricity pricing to market forces. We call this and other ways in which
government reduces its intervention Government Exit. In many cases,
Government Exit will not be absolute. A regulated party will still feel
other aspects of governmental influence after Government Exit. In the
context of electricity rate-setting deregulation, for example, firms will
still be constrained by antitrust laws. Nor must Government Exit
always take the form of wholesale deregulation. For example, a
regulatory threshold defining the class of regulated entities could be
relaxed but not entirely eliminated, or the intensity of permitting
standards and procedures could be reduced, as is done through the
general permit mechanism.15
There is equally a tail side of the coin, where the party receiving
benefits or subject to government restraint may also exit. Thus a party
may no longer be eligible to apply for welfare benefits or perhaps may
choose to no longer receive benefits. A factory subject to emissions
controls, for example, may choose to reduce its emissions to a level
where the restriction no longer covers it. We call this Party Exit, and it
often plays a central role in regulatory and entitlement program design.
Importantly, Government Exit and Party Exit are related;
indeed, one often depends upon the other. Government may set the
standards for benefits eligibility or thresholds for regulatory
supervision (the boundary conditions for coverage), but the choice to
exit in these settings—whether or not to modify behavior—ultimately

15. See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and
Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (discussing
the range of permitting models from general permitting to specific permitting).
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lies in the control of the regulated or benefited party. For example, if a
regulatory program defines a threshold for determining which
businesses are “in” the program, such as number of employees or
annual gross revenue, businesses might take measures to move “out” of
the program. A farmer may choose to exit a subsidy program rewarding
conservation of wetlands, for example, if eligibility requirements also
prohibit the use of pesticides.
3. When does exit occur?
Our definition of exit posits that exit occurs at a particular time.
For Government Exit, this happens in one of three ways. First,
Government Exit can occur when a predetermined threshold is met.
This would include the date in sunset legislation that expires after a set
period of years, such as the Bush-era tax breaks.16 Second, the program
may end when a predetermined funding limit has been met. For
example, $250,000 might be allocated for flood relief, and when the
money runs out the program ends.17 Alternatively, a program may cease
to operate when a specified threshold has been met, such as the federal
tax credits for hybrid and electric cars that ended once a specified
number of eligible cars had been sold.18 Finally, Government Exit may
occur after a political event. Political considerations may eliminate
funding of a program or even outright kill a program as part of a budget
bill.19 As described in Part IV, this is often a messy form of exit, a post
hoc decision made after the program has commenced.
Party Exit generally occurs in two scenarios, involuntary and
voluntary. Involuntary Party Exit occurs when an objective or
published and predetermined threshold has been met. This may be
automatic. A welfare recipient becomes ineligible, for example, if he or
16. Arlette Saenz, What Happens If the Bush Tax Cuts Expire?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fiscal-cliff-bush-tax-cuts-expire/story?id=17907791
[http://perma.cc/L47K-8YDS] (“The tax cuts in question were initially proposed by President
George W. Bush and passed by Congress in 2001 and 2003, but the law came with a 2010 expiration
date.”).
17. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL § V-6.1,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/5/V-6.1.pdf (Jan. 2014) [http://perma.cc/
BS6Z-ETM2] (for single-family and two- to four-family dwellings and other residential buildings
located in a participating community under the regular program, the maximum cap is $250,000).
18. The hybrid car income-tax credit was limited to 60,000 cars per manufacturer while the
credit for plug-in cars extends to 200,000 per manufacturer. John Voelcker, When Do Electric Car
Tax Credits Expire?, GREEN CAR REPORTS (July 15, 2013), http://www.greencarreports.com/news/
1085549_when-do-electric-car-tax-credits-expire [http:// perma.cc/DCC3-SVHL].
19. As discussed infra, this has been a popular strategy for opponents to the Affordable Care
Act. See, e.g., Chris Jacobs, Defunding Obamacare: The Next Best Option, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION ISSUE BRIEF #4002 (2013).
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she tests positive for drugs.20 It may also occur following a subjective
decision, when a party’s status must be determined by an official, such
as whether a recipient of disability funds is deemed no longer eligible.
Voluntary Party Exit also can occur in regulatory and funding
programs, either at the time a threshold has been satisfied, such as a
stationary source no longer emitting the minimal level of pollutants for
coverage,21 or upon request and government assent, such as a state
seeking release from supervision under the Voting Rights Act.22
Exit can also be gradual, with incremental steps resulting in a
reduction of governmental intervention. As described below, for
example, the Clean Air Act provides for discrete release from particular
mandates as a region’s ozone pollution gradually improves from
Extreme and Severe Nonattainment to Moderate and Marginal
Nonattainment.23
4. Where does exit occur?
As the simple examples described above make clear, exit is not
just about deregulation or defunding programs. Exit takes place in
three general settings.
The first is Takeover. Here, the government steps in and
effectively takes ownership or control for a limited period of time. This
was most obvious in the industry bailouts of 2008, where the
government acted as a silent or active investor, taking an ownership
interest in companies of critical national importance to economic
stability. An example from outside the administrative state involves
invasion, where the goals require air strikes or military intervention by
troops on the ground. Takeover can also occur when the federal or state
government steps in to take control of an insolvent or corrupt local
20. See KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 1:7 (2d. ed. 1996) (nine states have
mandatory drug testing requirements for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families recipients
under certain circumstances).
21. The use of mandated pollution control technologies under the Clean Air Act’s PSD
program, for example, only applies to facilities emitting more than one hundred tons per year in
one of twenty-eight source categories listed by the EPA. If a source emits ninety-nine tons per year,
it is not covered by this part of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2012).
22. Michael James Burns, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting the
Right Answer with the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2012) (“Under section 4(a)
of the VRA, a covered jurisdiction could become exempt from the requirement of section 5
preclearance by bringing an action for declaratory judgment in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.”).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7512(a)(1) (2012); Shari R. DeSalvo, Ozone Transport and the Clean Air Act:
The Answers are Blowin’ in the Wind, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 364 (1998) (“Control regimes are
established for each category; more polluted areas are required to take more and stronger
measures to reduce VOC and NOx emissions, and are given more time to attain the standard.”).
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government.24 In each of these situations and many others, there is a
clear understanding from the outset that the intervention will not be
permanent. At some point, the government will want its funds back, its
soldiers re-deployed, authority returned to local officials. As we will
discuss later, in these settings there is a shared understanding that the
responsibilities required in a takeover are not the traditional roles of
government. As a result, a government takeover should be a short-lived
experience and the exit strategy prominently considered before the
takeover occurs.
The second common exit category concerns Benefits. The
government offers access to public resources, subsidies, or other values
to classes of individuals or companies in an administrative process.
Government Exit occurs when the government ceases to provide
benefits. Government may “reinvent” welfare and eliminate certain
programs, or tighten conditions for eligibility.25 It may terminate
particular resource subsidy programs,26 or it may write tax incentives
out of the internal revenue code.27 Party Exit arises in this setting as
well, as parties find they can no longer meet eligibility requirements or
choose for other reasons not to receive government benefits. Exit in
these circumstances may seem entirely appropriate. The goal, after all,
is to provide benefits for particular ends––perhaps creating a safety net
for those in poverty so they can find a better paying job, or providing an
incentive for particular types of investments or resource extraction. As
we discuss later, through this vantage, exit actually should be seen as
a good thing, appropriate when the program’s goals have been met.
The last context in which exit commonly occurs is Regulation.
In this form of exit, the agency restricts the behavior of third parties
(private and/or public) and sets criteria for coverage under the program.
Government Exit occurs when the regulatory program is eliminated,
defunded, or scaled back. Party Exit occurs when the regulated parties
24. See, e.g., Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for Bankruptcy,
Setting Off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE PRESS, (July 19, 2013, 7:47
http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/NEWS01/307180107/Detroit-bankruptcy-filingAM),
Kevyn-Orr-emergency-manager [http://perma.cc/ 59MV-C6PG] (describing role played by stateappointed emergency manager).
25. See, e.g., Gary Burtless & R. Kent Weaver, Reinventing Welfare… Again: The Latest
Version of Reform Needs a Tune-up, BROOKINGS (Winter 1997), http://www.brookings.edu/
research/articles/1997/12/winter-welfare-burtless [http://perma.cc/29YH-FR6S].
26. See Matthew Philips, Wind Energy Companies Prepare for Tax Credit’s End, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS WEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/wind-energycompanies-prepare-for-tax-credits-end [http://perma.cc/KEM4-4BL9] (discussing the potential end
of the tax credit for wind energy companies).
27. See, e.g., Repeal of Geographically Targeted Economic Development Area Tax Incentives,
STATE
OF
CAL.
FRANCHISE
TAX
BOARD,
https://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/
Economic_Development_Incentives/Repeal_of_GTEDA.shtml [http://perma.cc/8PRQ-EC26].
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no longer meet the requirements for supervision. For example, an
industrial source that drops production of solid waste below 100 kg falls
outside the administrative reach of RCRA.28 When parties are released
from regulatory strictures, the message is that they no longer pose a
significant concern to the public (whether through pollution, market
manipulation, hiring practices, etc.) and thus no longer need
supervision to direct their behavior. As we discuss later, however,
regulatory exit thus presents two concerns. The first is that of
premature exit, where the party should still be regulated and releasing
it will exacerbate the underlying problem that led to regulation in the
first place. The second is that of tardy exit, where overregulation of too
many parties or by too many requirements leads to reductions in social
welfare.
5. How does exit occur?
Exit can occur as a binary “toggle switch” of the administrative
state. In Government Exit, either an agency occupies an area or it does
not. Jurisdictional and other prescribed boundaries define the scope of
coverage. In Party Exit, a party is either in or out, above or below the
threshold. This on/off vision of exit is oversimplified. In practice, the
boundaries of exit can often prove indistinct, even turbulent. It is more
accurate, therefore, to think of exit in terms of a spectrum, as shown in
the diagram below.
De Facto Exit
Full Exit <——————————————————> No Exit
Ratchet Exit
The clearest example, of course, is what we call Full Exit. Here,
the program or action has bright line boundaries and effectively
operates as a binary system, with a party either in or out. From the
vantage point of Government Exit, sunsetting a subsidy program means
that after a certain date the government will no longer provide specific
benefits, no matter how worthy the applicant. California’s deregulation
of the wholesale electricity sector provides a regulatory example of Full
Government Exit.29 Full Exit can occur with Party Exit, as well. If a
facility emits less than one hundred tons of carbon dioxide per year,
under the EPA’s “tailoring rule” it is no longer subject to the strictures

28.
29.

40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (2015).
See infra, Section II.A.
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of the Clean Air Act. A party can therefore modify its behavior to exit
the regime or stay in.30
It is important to note that Full Exit does not mean that the
party is therefore free of all governmental restraints. There may well
be other mandates in place such as the common law or other statutory
regimes. A facility no longer covered by the Clean Air Act, for example,
will still be subject to state environmental laws or to nuisance suits if
its pollution causes harm.
At the other end of the range lies No Exit. Like the existentialist
play by Sartre,31 this category covers administrative programs where
there is no expectation that the problem will be solved. Absent
regulation, problems will reappear, so exit is simply not a viable option.
For Government Exit, core military programs administered by the
Department of Defense fall under this category. It would be nice, but
hard to imagine, a setting in the near future where we do not require
an army or navy. Providing a military remains a core function of
government. For Party Exit, speed limits on highways provide an
example. Particularly skillful drivers are not allowed to exit speed limit
restrictions. Parties cannot choose whether or not to be subject to limits
based on how fast they can competently drive.32
Between the extremes of Full Exit and No Exit are at least two
types of partial exit. In these settings, the form of administrative action
changes and edges toward exit. This is most obvious with Ratchet Exit.
Here, Full Exit is clearly in sight but movement is stepwise, with
identifiable steps gradually reducing the government’s role. In
Government Exit, this occurs when the government starts to draw down
its level of management control after taking a major stake in banks or
corporations during the recession. Over time, there is a decreasing level
of governmental intervention. In Party Exit, this occurs when a party
moves from one discrete regulatory category to another within the
broader regulatory scheme. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
changed the nonattainment programs for ozone (smog) from a binary
system of attainment or nonattainment to ratcheted stages of
noncompliance. Depending on the level of nonattainment, a party can
move from the most egregious level of noncompliance, Severe (which
requires clean fuels programs and many other restrictions), to Moderate
(enhanced inspection and monitoring of vehicles), to Marginal
30. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 40
C.F.R. §§ 70.2, 71.2 (2015).
31. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT (Stuart Gilbert trans., Vintage Int’l ed. 1989) (depicting an
afterlife in which three deceased characters are punished by being locked into a room together for
eternity).
32. Although choosing not to drive at all would provide a form of exit in this setting.
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(entailing fewer restrictions), and ultimately to Full Exit (with no
strictures). At each step toward compliance, as the district cleans its
air, it faces fewer and fewer mandates and restrictions.
Another form of partial exit occurs through De Facto Exit, where
a party is formally subject to government strictures but not in practice.
Thus a prosecutor may decide not to enforce certain laws as a matter of
policy (e.g., not enforcing marijuana laws).33 There is no de jure exit in
this setting because the laws are still on the books and, at any moment,
the government could select someone to prosecute. However, the
government has de facto exited the regulatory scheme by declining to
enforce it. Similarly, a regulatory permit might define a term of ten
years, but all the permitted activities and conditions are accomplished
within three years. The permit is still alive, but the relationship
between permitting agency and permittee is over for all practical
purposes.
All four types of exit are at work under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).34 The ESA protects imperiled species by authorizing the Fish
and Wildlife Service to identify species that are “threatened” or
“endangered.”35 Wildlife species that are “listed” receive protection
under the statute through, among other mechanisms, a prohibition
against harming individual species members.36 Full Exit occurs when a
species is “delisted.” The population has recovered to a level where it is
no longer endangered or threatened,37 and consequently its regulatory
status goes from receiving the full protections of the Act to no protection
at all (at least not under the ESA). Ratchet Exit can occur any number
of ways. A species can be designated as threatened instead of
endangered, providing lesser protections.38 Or a landowner can apply
for a permit allowing a specified quantity of incidental “takes” of
protected species.39 The permitted activity, however, could be completed
well before the permit expires, creating a De Facto Exit. For example,
the permit term for the construction of a building might be stated as
ten years, while the building construction might be completed in three
years. Finally, there is effectively No Exit for so-called conservationreliant species. These are listed species for which the threats in the wild
33. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Raju Chebium, Justice Dept. Won’t Challenge State Marijuana
Laws, USA TODAY, (Aug. 29, 2013 6:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/08/29/justice-medical-marijuana-laws/2727605/ [http://perma.cc/9ZBW-WMDY].
34. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
35. Id. § 1533(a).
36. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
37. Id. § 1533(g).
38. Id. § 1533(d).
39. Id. § 1539(a).
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are so prevalent and intractable that the species cannot survive without
active intervention.40 The few California Condors living in the wild, for
example, are periodically trapped by wildlife agencies so their blood can
be filtered to reduce dangerously high blood-lead levels caused by eating
carcasses with lead shot.41
6. Why exit?
The preceding sections have explored the practice of exit in the
administrative state—what is exit, who exits, when they exit, where
they exit, and how they exit. In this concluding section of Part II, we
examine why government or parties exit—what policy objective does
exit serve?
Any consideration of Government Exit must start with the fact
of government intervention in the first place. Exit only makes sense in
the context of exiting from somewhere. It might be a regulatory scheme,
a benefits program, a pilot project, or some other initiative. Unless the
intention is for the governmental activity to continue indefinitely (a
prospect considered above when discussing No Exit), the possibility of
exit is inevitable.
The most obvious reason for exit is “mission accomplished”—the
government intervention has achieved its intended purpose. This is
obvious in the case of delisting an endangered species that has
recovered or withdrawing control of a corporation, taken over during a
financial crisis, that can now operate on its own. The opposite occurs,
as well, where the program has clearly failed and needs to be ended.
New information may come to light, or social norms might change over
time, suggesting the initial governmental intervention or program was
unnecessary, excessive, or counterproductive. Official school
segregation that ended before the Brown v. Board of Education decision
provides one example.42
Usually, though, success is less clear-cut but exit still seems
appropriate. One obvious reason is scarce resources. There is only so
much money to spend and exiting a program frees up resources for other
competing needs. This is a common situation facing philanthropies,
which fund worthwhile programs but do not wish to do so indefinitely.
Changed conditions can make the government intervention less
pressing. This may be driven by changing politics. In the rough-and40. E.g., J. Michael Scott et al., Recovery of Imperiled Species Under the Endangered Species
Act: The Need for a New Approach, 7 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENV’T 383, 386 (2005).
41. E.g., Susan Milius, Lead Stymies Condor Comeback, SCIENCE NEWS, Jul. 28, 2012, at 16.
42. Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional Adjudication: The
Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61, 98 (2008).
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tumble between and within the Executive and Legislative branches,
certain constituencies may be ascendant and demanding attention for
their causes while other constituencies are losing sway.
B. Defining Exit Success
Given that exit will be desirable in many settings, another
consideration, more normative than descriptive, is how to measure the
success of an exit strategy and assess whether one type of exit is
superior to another for a given context. We suggest there are four basic
metrics of exit success.
Stickiness. Successful exit should ensure the persistence of the
desired behavior change or condition over time once the regime has
ended or the party has exited. For example, if a species is delisted, it
should not need the protections of the ESA soon after. When a tax credit
is removed, the hope is that it has spurred sufficient investment in the
desired sector. The rapid reappearance of the problem that justified
intervention in the first place is a sign of poorly planned or premature
exit. Conversely, while exit can be premature, it can also be too late. We
want parties in the program to avoid developing dependence and
inability to exit. This is one of the classic criticisms of the welfare
state.43
Avoided Capture. A related though different challenge lies in
capture––where parties subject to agency oversight unduly influence
agency decisions for their private profit. We see this in benefits
programs where subsidies endure for long periods of time because the
beneficiaries exercise political influence that hinders Government
Exit.44 Regulated parties can also lobby to prevent Government Exit to
ensure continued supply of a competitive benefit. The inability of city
governments to deregulate taxi medallion systems, for example,
ensures that supply remains limited and prices remain higher than
would be the case without such a system.45 Public choice theory provides
the classic explanation for why such support programs for concentrated
interests effectively operate as No-Exit regimes.46 Taxi drivers,
43. E.g., Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 341 (1994)
(citations omitted) (discussing the criticisms of welfare, including dependency).
44. See generally Huber, supra note 10 (describing capture in the context of public property
used for private purposes).
45. See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of the New York
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125, 128 (2013) (“By inflating fares and limiting the
availability of taxis, expensive licenses likely harm taxi consumers . . . .”).
46. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998) (Regulatory “goods” demanded by organized subgroups of citizenry
dominate over regulatory interests of individual voters).

2015]

REGULATORY EXIT

1311

ranchers, and other concentrated beneficiaries of agency programs
lobby hard to keep their preferred status. Thus one metric of exit
strategy success is avoiding political capture by concentrated interests.
Flexibility to changing circumstances. Government regulatory
and benefits programs evolve over time in response to new information,
shifting political coalitions, and other changed circumstances. Welfare
reform, for example, has altered and continues to alter benefits over
time to reflect changing social norms and fiscal conditions. As a
component of regulatory and benefits programs, exit strategies should
incorporate sufficient flexibility to evolve as well. Indeed, the rise of
adaptive management as a regulatory and benefits program
implementation method demands exit flexibility over time.47
Signaling and rhetorical power. Although exit often stands
silently in the background as parties move along the spectrum, in some
cases exit can send a powerful message. Full Exit can send the message
to the public that the mission has been accomplished or to the
beneficiary community that no further help is at hand and the parties
have to make do for themselves. Equally, the impossibility of exit,
reflected in an official No Exit program policy, can communicate to
other parties the seriousness of the government’s commitment to a
regulatory program. When appropriate, then, exit should send a
message to the regulated community or the public.

47. The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions,
but that the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes
differentiating between the “front end” and the “back end” of decisionmaking much less relevant.
Rather than make one grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive management
engage in a program of iterative decisionmaking following a structured multistep protocol: (1)
definition of the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management, (3)
determination of the baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions,
(6) implementation and management actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step
(1). Formal, time-limited public-participation junctures, such as the notice-and-comment process
of conventional APA-style administrative rulemaking, are not a component of adaptive
management; rather, public input is derived through an emphasis on more loosely defined
processes for “stakeholder involvement” and multiparty “collaborative planning.” With deep roots
in natural resources management theory, the adaptive management protocol has begun to make
inroads in public lands management in particular, though it has been applied or proposed in other
policy contexts including pollution control, financial regulation, environmental impact assessment,
public health and safety, civil rights, and social welfare. Adaptive management programs must
incorporate flexible exit strategies every bit as much as they incorporate flexible regulation and
benefits. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014) (explaining the adaptive management
decisionmaking process).
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III. DESIGNING EXIT STRATEGIES
As should be clear by now, exit in the administrative state is a
wide-ranging and multifaceted phenomenon. Despite the breadth and
endless number of exit examples, we argue that a simple model can
prove analytically useful, explaining why we see particular types of exit
strategies in certain settings and not others. This holds true for both
Government Exit and Party Exit.
Our model involves a 2 x 2 matrix. The first dimension measures
when the exit strategy design decision is made. Ex ante design decisions
occur at the front end of the intervention, during the design of the
program itself and prior to its implementation. Ex post exit design
occurs after the intervention has begun. The second dimension reflects
the clarity of conditions necessary for exit to occur, regardless of
whether they are designed ex ante or ex post. Are the exit requirements
clear? This dimension runs from Transparent to Opaque.
Much is obviously lost when examining as complicated a
phenomenon as regulatory exit along just two dimensions. This is by no
means a comprehensive model. Nevertheless, this simple framework
reveals a great deal of what really drives the design and operation of
exit in the administrative state.
A. Ex Ante versus Ex Post
While there are many reasons for exit, a central concern for both
Government Exit and Party Exit concerns when the conditions for exit
are determined. The time at which parties understand the
consequences of exit has an important influence on behavior in a wide
range of legal settings. This is as true for spouses contemplating
separation and divorce, or for parties deciding whether to breach a
contract and bargain in the shadow of the law, as it is for government
takeovers, benefits, and regulatory programs.
In ex ante settings, the relevant decision-maker establishes the
process and conditions for exit before engagement. For Government
Exit, this is often achieved through “sunsetting,” which describes when
there is a determination at program creation that the program will
automatically expire on a certain date unless there is explicit
reauthorization.48 The assault weapons ban and Bush-era tax cuts

48. For a critique of sunsetting, see Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PENN. L.
REV. 1007 (2011).
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provide two recent examples.49 As the exit date approaches, there may
be sufficient political support to prevent this from happening, but it
requires action on the part of those who wish to block the exit path.
For Party Exit, the conditions are known before entering the
program and a party can choose whether to remain within the program.
Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for example,
wastes that are reused in the same process within ninety days are
exempted from the statute’s requirements for waste disposal.50 For
business reasons, a manufacturing plant may or may not choose to
make use of the recycling exemption, but it understands the option
before designing its production process. Ex ante exit design also could
employ Ratchet Exit techniques by establishing tiers of regulatory
thresholds defining different levels of intervention, thus providing
incentives for Party Exit. Ex ante design can also establish a No Exit
regime. Thus, the Selective Service program requires all eighteen-yearolds to register and does not allow deregistration.
In ex post settings, the process and conditions for exit are
established after engagement has commenced. The classic example of
this for Government Exit is after a military invasion (when the
parameters for leaving may not be clear even after exit). In the
administrative state, an obvious example may be found in deregulation,
such as when a political decision is made to end a program with no
sunset provisions, as happened in California with the deregulation of
wholesale electricity pricing.51 Or Congress may choose to change the
conditions in mid-stride, such as welfare reform that makes it harder to
obtain coverage.52 Ex post exit can also occur more subtly, as sometimes
happens behind the scenes when Congress engages in “zero-budgeting”
through appropriation bills, forbidding existing programs to spend any
money pursuing their goals.53

49. Michael G. Lenett, Taking a Bite Out of Violent Crime, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 573, 609
(1995) (discussing the features of the law, including the sunset provision after ten years); Saenz,
supra note 16.
50. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e) (2015); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
51. Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforcement in
the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 275 (2003) (discussing the deregulation of
electricity pricing in California).
52. Michele E. Kenney, A Pitfall of Judicial Deference: Equal Protection of the Laws Fails
Women in Lewis v. Thompson, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 525, 525 (2002) (discussing the “Welfare Reform
Act” and its limitations on coverage for immigrant populations).
53. Jerry Gray, Senate Backs Moratorium in Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/09/us/senate-backs-moratorium-in-species-act.html
[http://perma.cc/34NW-SX4P].
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B. Transparent versus Opaque
This dimension measures how difficult it is to determine
whether the conditions for exit have been satisfied—how clearly the
pathway to exit is mapped. A number of factors determine this level of
clarity. Are the exit requirements objective and clear, or subjective and
murky? Does the burden of proof rest with the government or the other
party? The clarity of thresholds for coverage of regulated parties such
as age, income, emissions, number of employees, or weekly hours
worked, for example, is often a necessary precondition of what we call
Transparent Exit. Absent clearly articulated conditions, exit is more
difficult to predict, in what we call Opaque Exit.
It is important to note that this distinction turns not on the
actual cost or ease of exiting, but on the perceived ease. One could have
clear, objective conditions but very difficult exit opportunities because
the requirements to leave the program are highly demanding either in
terms of performance or the burden of proof. Transparent Exit means
only that it is easy for parties to know precisely what exit will require.
Hence the transaction costs of this determination are low, though the
actual costs of exiting could be low or high. We are not suggesting that
actual costs of exit do not matter, or that they are not part of the exit
strategy design decision. Rather, the clarity of exit conditions will drive
how easy it is for government and program participants to determine
the costs and other demands of exit early on.
To a certain extent, the Transparent/Opaque distinction tracks
the well-known difference between rules and standards.54 In
Transparent Exit conditions, for example, determining how exit is
accomplished is made simple through rule-like thresholds and
requirements. For Government Exit, a law with a sunset provision
makes exit automatic. The program may be extended, but doing so
requires political action. For Party Exit, programs with clear conditions
for coverage make Transparent Exit prevalent. In child welfare
programs, once you reach the age of eighteen, you are out.55 Farmers
can choose whether or not to apply for or continue receiving price
supports. The same is true for beneficiaries of resource extraction

54. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 166–67
(2015) (“Rules come in handy for individuals trying to figure out whether their contemplated
conduct is prohibited or permitted. The same kind of ex ante clarity is not readily available under
standards, whose precise implications for a given course of action are determined by a court or an
agency only after the fact.”).
55. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A
Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 559 (2006)
(discussing the negative impacts of ending child welfare programs at age eighteen).
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subsidies such as grazing. Either you meet the thresholds or you do not.
Depending on the particular program, of course, the thresholds may be
difficult to meet, but the possibility of exit is straightforward and the
transaction costs of determining the rules of exit are low.
For Opaque Exit, determining the conditions for departure can
be more difficult and costly given the standard-based approach.
Deregulation almost always entails political battles because certain
vested interests will want to retain the status quo. Delisting a species
from the ESA is a subjective determination regarding its “recovery” and
demands a high evidentiary burden.56 Taking a site off of the National
Priority List under Superfund functions in a similar manner, with
judgments about “how clean is clean” varying from site to site.57
Combining the two dimensions of timing and clarity allows us to
create a simple matrix, shown in Figure 1. The boxes highlight
representative examples of Government Exit and Party Exit. We
readily admit that there will be examples that do not fit neatly in any
single box. Nonetheless, these categories have significant analytic
power in explaining why exit strategies look the way they do and are
preferable in some settings but not in others.

56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(a) (2012) (requiring the decision be based on “the best scientific
and commercial data available”); § 1533(f) (outlining the requirement of recovery plans).
57. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425 (2015) (identifying the criteria, methods, and procedures used to
establish priorities for remedial actions).
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For a recent example, consider climate change regulation in the
United States. Following the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts
v. EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency under the Obama
administration set in motion the regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions, but it faced a series of challenges.58 Greenhouse gases had
never been regulated under the Clean Air Act before, so enabling
regulations needed to be promulgated. Unfortunately, the statutory
basis for these regulations mandated obtaining permits if new sources
emitted more than one hundred tons of a pollutant per year. The
problem is that greenhouse gases are much more common than
conventional pollutants and this threshold would have required
obtaining permits for hundreds of thousands of sources.59 To avoid this
absurd result, EPA promulgated the “Tailoring Rule” which, among
other things, establishes a threshold of one hundred thousand tons of
greenhouse gas emissions per year for the permitting requirement. This
presents a classic case of Mapped Exit not because exit is easy (indeed
it will be quite difficult for large power plants), but because it is easy
for parties to know at the outset what exit entails, and therefore the
transaction costs of this decision are low.60
And what are the design benefits of Mapped Exit using the
metrics developed above in Part II.B? For starters, Mapped Exit is easy
to assess and implement. In Party Exit, for example, the regulated
party or beneficiary has satisfied a clear requirement or avoided
thresholds that were explicitly anticipated. It also serves a clear
purpose. The termination point for welfare based on income or time on
the program makes sense—people should not receive welfare if they
have sufficient income to support themselves, and a limited time for
assistance creates an incentive to find work.
Mapped exit should also ensure lower transaction costs of
determining eligibility criteria. The actual costs of exiting could be
high—for example, the costs associated with lowering emissions to exit
a pollution control program—but the clarity of the conditions for exit
allows government and program participants to identify exit costs and
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
59. EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule
(June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/apti/video/TailoringRule/tailoring.pdf [http://perma.cc/ VG9QFJH9] (“Without the Tailoring Rule, there would have been millions of newly-subject sources and
the costs would have been in the tens of billions of dollars.”).
60. Clear thresholds such as this work both ways, in that a facility could move into rather
than out from under regulation if its emissions rise. Hannah Wiseman has proposed embedding
cumulative effects thresholds into regulatory programs, under which tighter regulatory controls
on all sources of a harm would be triggered when the aggregate harm crosses a threshold. See
Wiseman, supra note 13, at 279–83. Such a mechanism, presumably, would also work both ways,
allowing Mapped Exit as aggregate harm levels fall below the threshold.
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thereby engage in political discourse over whether the exit conditions
should be changed. This provides a classic example of bargaining in the
shadow of the law.61
A program where the requirements for exit are well understood
from the beginning sends a signal to the regulated and benefited
communities that exit may be low cost or high cost depending on the
specifics, but that the cost can be calculated up front and behavior
changed accordingly. A predictable exit strategy, in other words, may
provide incentives for parties to enter and comply with the regulatory
or funding program conditions.62
Mapped Exit also may help to reduce the danger of political
capture and public choice pressures. In programs with a clear end date
or conditions for exit, it should be more difficult for parties to expand
benefits because it will require political capital to change the status quo.
The requirements have already been set and any modifications will
require new action. It is not easy to override a sunset provision,
although, as will be seen with Uncertain Exit, it can be done. Low
transaction costs associated with Mapped Exit may also be appropriate
for a long program life with a fluid universe of covered parties, thus
enhancing flexibility to changed circumstances.
Equally, however, Mapped Exit also poses potential pitfalls. As
described earlier, premature exit may worsen the very problem the
governmental intervention was designed to prevent. A subtler problem
can occur with arbitrary endpoints, when there has been inadequate
consideration of what follows the sunset date. In the Acid Rain Trading
Program under the Clean Air Act, there has been no planning for what
happens after the gross emissions cap is met and there are still
outstanding allowances otherwise eligible for trading.63 There is great
concern in California over what happens to carbon credits after the capand-trade program ends in 2020. What are allowances worth after that?

61. See generally Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
62. Curt Bradley and Mitu Gulati have made a similar claim in support of customary
international law, arguing that nations will be more likely to comply with customary law if they
understand ex ante the costs of exit. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from
International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 269 (2010). See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting
Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005) (discussing exit provisions in international treaties and the
reasons nations choose to exit treaties).
63. Lesley McAllister, The End of the Acid Rain Program, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM
BLOG (July 12, 2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1F5EE49E-E7EA6ACC-52991D37F7935E74 [http://perma.cc/7A67-L26E].
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A similar story could be told about production tax credits for renewable
energy.64
2. Uncertain Exit (Ex Ante & Opaque)
In an Uncertain Exit, exit has been accounted for up front, but
the specific conditions for exit are difficult to determine in practice. In
these settings, subjective standards make the exit decision dependent
on a discretionary judgment. In regulatory contexts, the regulated party
must meet a high burden of proof to obtain exit approval from the
agency and often incurs a correspondingly high cost to meet the
conditions.
Consider, for example, the practice of delisting a species under
the ESA. A rare example among regulatory statutes, the very purpose
of the ESA is to put itself out of business by promoting the recovery of
listed species to the point of justifying delisting. Yet the delisting
process has seldom been used.65 This ex ante strategy is subjective and
requires a high burden of proof. Whether a species should be listed as
endangered or threatened is based on five amorphous factors: (1) the
present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its
habitat or range; (2) overutilization for commercial, recreational,
scientific, or educational purposes; (3) disease or predation; (4) the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (5) other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence.66 The statute
establishes a variety of regulatory programs designed to “conserve”
listed species, including “all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary.”67 Delisting thus requires proving a negative—that
the conditions leading to the listing no longer exist. This creates an
Uncertain Exit situation because the requirements for exit are openended and heavily fact-dependent.
Uncertain Exit is well-suited to situations where there is a
diversity of individual circumstances. Such diversity makes cookie-

64. Production Tax Credit for Renewable Energy, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/production-taxcredit-for.html [http://perma.cc/2VN9-N582] (discussing the disruptive effects of “off/on” expiration
and renewal of the tax credits).
65. See J. Michael Scott et al., By the Numbers, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY:
RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE 1 (Dale D. Goble et al., eds., 2006) (discussing the low
number of recovered species).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2012).
67. Id. § 1532(3).
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cutter decisions difficult. Every species is different, hence there is no
adequate formula for delisting based on, say, population numbers or
geographic range. As a result, agency decisions in Uncertain Exit
resemble adjudication with the associated costs/time required to assess
evidence and policy concerns. Because of this case-by-case process, one
would expect that Uncertain Exit will usually have high transaction
costs. Concern exists over premature exit, but there is sufficient
demand for clarity that broad ex ante provisions are adopted.
While the conditions for Uncertain Exit are articulated at the
outset, in practice their application is difficult to predict. Under the
Superfund law, for example, many contaminated site remediations
remain under indefinite operation and monitoring. Concerns over postexit conditions (is the site truly cleaned up?) lead to reluctance to
approve exit.68 The discretion exercised by officials creates a pragmatic
balance between subjective standards and objective rules. One might
also expect Uncertain Exit to signal a strong commitment by
government that parties can’t game the system and officials will need
to be well and truly satisfied before approving exit.
The above examples concern instances of intentionally designed
Uncertain Exit, but Mapped Exit can transform into Uncertain Exit.
The Bush-era Tax Cuts and the ban on assault weapons initially looked
like examples of Mapped Exit because sunset provisions clearly state
when the programs end. As the credibility of commitment was
undermined, however, deadlines were extended and the conditions
under which the legislature would eventually sunset the programs
became unclear.69 This is also readily apparent in the case of grazing
permits on public lands, where exit has become virtually meaningless.
Permits are supposed to expire after ten years and be either
reconsidered or offered to the public. But in practice, they are routinely
renewed for the same users, often for decades.70 Exit was built-in ex
ante as Mapped Exit, but capture has rendered the transparency
ineffective and converted the exit regime to Uncertain Exit. This is
equally true for mining and water rights.71

68. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.420 (2015) (describing the “methods, procedures, and criteria the
agency shall use to . . . evaluate releases”).
69. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 26 of the
U.S. Code).
70. See generally Huber, supra note 10.
71. See id. at 994–95.
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3. Adaptive Exit (Ex Post & Transparent)
Adaptive Exit occurs when clear standards are established for
exit but not until after the program has commenced. This is most
appropriate in the face of uncertainty. It may be the case that it
appeared too difficult to predict the conditions for exit at the time of
program creation, and so exit decisions were intentionally pushed off
under the assumption that agencies will learn over time as the program
develops. It may also be the case that the demand for exit is only
recognized after creation of the program, when experience makes clear
that the original mechanism or conditions for exit were inadequate,
making exit either too easy or too difficult.
Deregulation provides the bluntest example of Adaptive Exit,
where the government simply departs from a formerly regulated area.
Zero-budgeting, such as forbidding the use of agency funds to list
endangered species, also presents an example of Adaptive Exit after the
program has begun (although zero-budgeting tends to be a relatively
short-lived strategy).72 Adaptive Exit can also be more sophisticated.
The Clean Air Act, for example, requires regulation of “stationary
sources.” In the classic case Chevron v. NRDC, an environmental group
challenged the EPA’s decision to treat an entire facility as a stationary
source (through so-called bubbling) rather than regulating each specific
smokestack.73 This presented an example of efficiency-enhancing
Adaptive Exit, since companies could avoid regulation if they increased
emissions at one source so long as they reduced emissions from another
source under the same facility bubble.
California’s deregulation of electricity pricing provides an
instructive example of Adaptive Exit gone wrong. In the 1990s, seeking
to introduce competition into the electricity market and drive down
prices, California changed its longstanding practice of regulating both
wholesale and retail electricity rates. The state deregulated only the
wholesale market, requiring the major investor-owned utilities to
purchase their electricity through the new Power Exchange (“PX”).74 PX
quickly developed into an active market and prices did drop initially.

72. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321, 1321-160 (1996).
73. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984).
74. For a history of the California crisis, see Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale:
Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 480 (2002); James L. Sweeney,
The California Electricity Crisis: Lessons for the Future 2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript),
http://web.stanford.edu/~jsweeney/paper/Lessons%20for%20the%20Future.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XFE3-GC79]. After California’s exit, the wholesale market was still regulated by
FERC, but it chose not to intervene.
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However, PX operated as a commodity market with significant
volatility and was vulnerable to market manipulation. In the summer
of 2000, wholesale electricity prices rose dramatically, due partly to
manipulation by Enron and power generators. Utilities thus were
caught in the pincers of buying expensive power wholesale in the PX
and then being forced to sell at a loss at fixed rates to consumers (who
still operated under a regulated market). As losses mounted, utilities
lost their credit and Pacific Gas & Electric filed for bankruptcy. The
state government rushed back into the market, with the Department of
Water Resources spending almost nine billion dollars to purchase
electricity in order to prevent further blackouts. Adaptive exit proved
extremely costly for California, costing the governor his job.
From a political economy perspective, Adaptive Exit should be
less common than Mapped Exit or Uncertain Exit because it requires
ex post action. This requires the marshaling of political interests to
change the status quo, and thus can be politically volatile or costly.
Even if there is a general acknowledgment that the original
assumptions about exit have proven inadequate, that the program
structure has proven too unwieldy or entrenched, or that the program
was designed to adapt but has not, the costs of ex post change may prove
high and potentially prohibitive.
4. Messy Exit (Ex Post & Opaque)
In the last category, Messy Exit, there are no––or poorly
defined––ex ante conditions or mechanisms for exit, either because
debating and designing exit had prohibitively high transaction costs or
because the program was designed at inception as a No Exit strategy.
As with Adaptive Exit, the demand for exit is recognized only after
creation of the program. The difference is that, with Messy Exit, once
the program has begun, either because of experience, politics, or
changed conditions, demand for exit rises. But whether exit is even
appropriate, much less under what conditions, leads to sharp
disagreement. The highly politicized nature of the issue makes minor
adjustments needed for Adaptive Exit difficult. Only blunt political
intervention (in the case of Government Exit) or dramatic actions such
as civil disobedience or offshoring (in the case of Party Exit) can create
the opportunity for exit, and either way it comes at a high cost.
Messy Exit has clearly been playing out in the drama
surrounding the Affordable Care Act. At the time of passage, it was
highly contested whether government should even enter the area, and
there was no discussion of Government Exit. As a result, the program
was portrayed as a No Exit scenario. The whole point of a national
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health care system is to extend comprehensive coverage; thus there was
no tolerance among supporters of the measure for discussing the terms
of Government Exit. Following passage, the botched efforts by Tea
Party activists in the House and Senate to force the de-funding or delay
of the health care law in exchange for government spending provided a
perfect example of a failed Messy Exit.
Or consider the example of the ill-fated Project XL initiative by
the EPA. The EPA started a national pilot program in 1995 that sought
to encourage “superior environmental results [of companies and
communities] beyond those that would have been achieved under
current and reasonably anticipated future regulations or policies”
among other criteria. EPA hoped that highlighting such eXcellence and
Leadership (hence the acronym, “XL”) would identify strategies to
achieve cleaner and cheaper environmental results than traditional
reliance on regulations. As an incentive, the EPA offered the prospect
of “regulatory flexibility” for participants. In practice, though, the EPA
could not legally offer meaningful waivers or streamlined permits, and
the program was shut down in 2002.75 In retrospect, Project XL provides
an example of failed Messy Exit, where the features of ex post exit were
never clearly set out because the EPA’s authority to offer such relief
was itself uncertain.
_____
Synthesizing the foregoing discussion of the categories of exit
and their respective political economies, the chart below sets out the
key factors influencing when we would expect to see the four categories
of exit strategies in play.

75. See Allen Blackman & Janice Mazurek, The Cost of Developing Site-Specific
Environmental Regulation: Evidence from EPA’s Project XL 1 (Resources for the Future Discussion
Paper 99-35-REV, 2000). For the history of Project XL, see id.; Rena Steinzor, Regulatory
Reinvention and Project XL: Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVT’L L. REPORTER 10527
(1996).
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Using the model’s descriptive power, we can now understand
better the regulatory dynamic playing out in real time in the case of
domestic climate change regulation. The application of the Clean Air
Act’s New Source Performance Standards to electric utilities and
petroleum refineries provides a clear example of Mapped Exit. Emission
limits determine whether or not a facility is subject to the Act’s
restrictions. The EPA has been in the process of promulgating
regulations that will set forth the appropriate control technology for
these sectors. The Tailoring Rule, described earlier,76 represents
Adaptive Exit, where the threshold for exit is changed as a mid-course
correction. Adaptive and Messy Exit are also in play, with Congress
proposing legislation that would prohibit the EPA from addressing
climate change, on the one hand, and the Supreme Court being asked
to decide whether the EPA must address climate change, on the other.77
IV. REGULATORY EXIT CHALLENGES AND INNOVATIONS
In Part II, we set out the basic features of exit in the
administrative state. In Part III, we created a model that identified four
different types of exit strategies, examined the characteristics of each
strategy, and described when they were most likely to occur. In this
Part, we put the model to work, showing that it has both descriptive
and predictive power.
A. Applying the Model to Emerging Issues
Our central contention is that exit strategies matter and thus
legislatures and agencies should explicitly consider exit at the creation
of new regulatory programs. We can show this by considering the
importance of exit strategies to what has become one of the most
controversial environmental issues across the nation––hydraulic
fracturing techniques for enhanced recovery of oil and gas resources
from deep shale formations, popularly known as fracking. Fracking
involves drilling deep into impermeable shale deposits, extending the
drilling zone outward through horizontal drilling, pumping fluids into
the shale at high pressure to create cracks, thus allowing the previously
trapped oil and gas to flow, and injecting sand and other “proppants”

76. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); H.R. 4808, 113th Cong.
(2014); H.R. 4813, 113th Cong. (2014).
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into the cracks to keep them open.78 This technique has opened up vast
new reserves of oil and gas in the United States, making natural gas
less costly and contributing to economic development in drilling
communities, greater national energy security, movement away from
coal as an energy source, and a revival of the petrochemical industry.79
Fracking has downsides familiar to oil and gas extraction in
general, including air and water pollution, water usage, and induced
ground tremors.80 Because fracking is both new and spreading fast
throughout many parts of the nation, “[t]he magnitude of all these risks
is uncertain and highly contested.”81
Concerned with the threat of fracking to groundwater supplies,
but eager to reap the economic benefits from drilling, the federal
government and states have been wrestling over how best to regulate
fracking activity.82 In 2005, Congress adopted an amendment to the
Safe Drinking Water Act that expressly created an exemption for
fracking from the definition of “underground injection.”83 This
effectively left the management of fracking to the states. Many states
have adopted fracking rules of some kind, choosing among twenty-five
different regulatory elements within eight activities.84 The result has
been a wide range of regulations, differing minimum standards, and
case-by-case reviews of permit and variance applications, with some
states imposing strict requirements and others regulating with a much
lighter touch.
Legal scholars have proposed their own approaches, ranging
from information forcing and best management practices to permitting
standards and negligence-based regulation.85 All of these proposals,

78. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 152–54
(2013).
79. See id. at 154–70.
80. See id. at 170–80.
81. Id. at 187.
82. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 9 (June 2013), http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-RptStateofStateRegs_Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/68VJ-FMZU] (providing a comprehensive review of
the different elements used in state regulations).
83. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 78, at 200–01. The so-called “Halliburton loophole”
exempted “underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
84. See RICHARDSON, ET AL., supra note 82, at 22–75 (describing various state fracking
regulations).
85. See, e.g., David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1546–71 (2014) (market based regime); Merrill & Schizer, supra
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however, have tackled the problem exclusively through the lens of
regulatory entry; none considers how exit should factor into the design.
In fact, all four types of exit strategy can and should be part of the
analysis. Consider, for example, the following range of approaches.
 A Mapped Exit strategy would establish clear quantitative
thresholds for coverage, such as no fracking within 1,000 feet of
public drinking water supply, injection of more than 1,000 kg of
fracking fluid in a set time frame, etc. Fracking operations are
either covered or not.
 An Uncertain Exit strategy would rely on ex ante qualitative
standards. Officials might require a permit unless the operation
proves no likelihood of endangerment, or require a bond that will
be released once an official has determined through post-drilling
monitoring that there is no significant environmental impact.
Only when such a standard has been met can the fracking
company exit the regulatory regime.
 An Adaptive Exit strategy would deliberately defer exit design
for later based on lack of knowledge about the risks of fracking.
The initial statute might have thresholds and standards, but
over time the government may reach the conclusion that the
level of regulation is excessively intense or costly, at which point
the agency could introduce exclusions or graduated thresholds.
The agency could equally make fracking regulations more
demanding, creating additional requirements.
 Finally, a Messy Exit strategy would be the result of no
consideration being given to exit at all, likely for political
reasons. The regulatory regime would look much like it does
today, or even more restrictive. Exit would arise later in a major
political conflict. A perceived energy crisis, for example, might
lead to calls for relaxing rules or streamlining permits in order
to extract more natural gas. Or the benefits of fracking could be
deemed so substantial, but so restrained by the regulatory
regime, that a complete overhaul is accomplished through
politically-driven deregulation—more like a hacksaw compared
to Adaptive Exit’s scalpel.

note 78, at 201–57 (liability based regime); Hannah J. Wiseman, Hydraulic Fracturing and
Information Forcing, 74 OHIO ST. L. J. FURTHERMORE 86, 89–97 (2013) (information based regime).
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When applied to fracking, our model adds value for two reasons.
First, considering exit changes the question asked from just “how much
should we regulate?” to also include “how and when should we allow
types of exit to occur and what should they look like?” Second, taking
exit clearly into account ensures that the costs and benefits of different
exit approaches, which necessarily play a part in the overall regulatory
regime’s costs and benefits, will be explicitly assessed. Even if on the
margins, this can be important.
For example, the Mapped Exit approach allows fracking
companies to determine the likely costs of compliance prior to
commencing operations as well as the costs of avoiding regulatory
coverage. Parties currently fracking can decide whether the costs to
enter into compliance justify continued fracking. Adding Mapped Exit
as a design consideration can also affect how the thresholds are
designed. For example, a graduated set of site setback thresholds could
be coupled with decreasing levels of regulation. This would produce a
ratchet model allowing even finer assessment of exit costs and benefits
by the regulated operations.86
The most promising exit strategy, however, would likely be
Adaptive Exit, for two reasons. First, fracking poses novel
environmental risks. There are too many unknowns to design the clear,
quantitative restrictions found in a Mapped Exit approach.87 Indeed, if
exit had been explicitly considered at the regulatory design stage, some
states might have employed less quantitative regulation than they do
today, when in hindsight the regulations appear poorly chosen. Second,
the regulation of fracking has become a highly contentious political
issue, with some state and local jurisdictions choosing to ban fracking
altogether.88 Inserting exit thresholds into regulation is more difficult
in such a heated political environment.
As our model predicts, Adaptive Exit provides a strategy welltailored to politically contentious issues with significant uncertainties.
By design, the program is shaped explicitly to facilitate a more informed
understanding of the issue so that, at a later date and with greater
knowledge, the agency has the authority to relax or restrict the initial
regulations as appropriate.

86. To be precise, this would be an example of Mapped Ratchet Party Exit.
87. See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 78, at 180–97 (discussing the novel risks).
88. See
Local
Actions
Against
Fracking,
FOOD
AND
WATER
WATCH,
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-center/local-action-documents/
[http://perma.cc/C379-PAC6] (listing all state and local fracking bans).
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B. Lookback Exit
As with fracking, emerging regulatory challenges often arise in
sparse information environments and are politically contested. At
bottom, Adaptive Exit and Messy Exit both present attractive “punt it”
responses to political divisiveness or perceived lack of information,
particularly when both the information flow and political discourse is
dynamic and unpredictable. However, Adaptive Exit and Messy Exit
not only defer exit design decisions until after program implementation,
they also involve no prior commitment whatsoever to engage the exit
question. They are reactive rather than proactive, and arise in an ad
hoc fashion.
To be sure, administrations have often pledged to engage in a
more purposive Adaptive Exit by periodically changing or removing
rules they conclude are out of date, unnecessary, or overly burdensome,
as most recently the Obama Administration’s Regulatory Lookback
initiative has promised.89 These retrospective reviews can lead to
significant reductions in government intervention, but they are
hampered by two constraints. First, as executive initiatives, they are ad
hoc, unenforceable, and unaccountable without significant executive
commitment, institutionalization, and follow-through. Second, even
with that kind of executive engagement, agencies are stuck with the
statutes they administer, which usually do not reflect the legislature
having given much thought to exit. A statute designed exclusively
around entry is unlikely to provide a robust platform for an agency later
to explore exit options. As a result, the product of retrospective
regulatory review is more often than not deregulation in the form of
eliminating rules and requirements.90 Ideally, an agency also should be
in a position to adopt Mapped Exit or Uncertain Exit strategies after
the program has commenced.
89. Regulatory Lookback is the Obama Administration’s term for retrospective regulatory
review, under which “agencies shall consider how best to promote retrospective analysis of rules
that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burdensome, and to modify,
streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance with what has been learned.” Exec. Order 13563,
76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see Howard Shelanski, Reducing Costs and Burdens: Further
Progress in Regulatory Lookback Effort, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET BLOG (May 7, 2014, 7:05 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/05/07/reducing-costs-and-burdens-further-progressregulatory-lookback-effort [http://perma.cc/5VHL-SVLE] (“Ensuring regulatory flexibility for
businesses and reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens through the retrospective review process
are top priorities for the President and the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs.”). For descriptions of Regulatory Lookback and previous administrations’ retrospective
regulatory review initiatives, see Bull, supra note 14 at 277–86 and Coglianese, supra note 14, at
58–59.
90. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 182–83 (listing various accomplishments of the
Regulatory Lookback initiative, most of which were deregulatory in nature).

1330

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:5:1295

We believe government should consider committing to designing
for exit in all cases, even cases when at the front end of program design
the politics are difficult and information is incomplete. To encourage
this, we propose a new model of exit—what we call “Lookback Exit”—to
overcome the shortcomings of Regulatory Lookback and similar
retrospective regulatory review initiatives through two novel
components: (1) embedding authority for Adaptive Exit and Uncertain
Exit explicitly in the statute ex ante, and (2) requiring the agency to
engage in the lookback process and to justify its decision to use or not
to use its embedded authority.
First, unlike the case with the Obama Administration’s
Regulatory Lookback and similar initiatives, under Lookback Exit the
legislature would embed the tools of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit
in the statute at the front end, explicitly making them available to the
agency as it engages in the lookback process without having to engage
in creative statutory interpretation. This approach would remove all
doubt that the agency has the authority to engage in Adaptive Exit by
adopting the methods of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit as the
program moves forward.
Indeed, there are already a number of examples where
embedded exit tools have been placed in existing statutes to accomplish
Lookback Exit. This is clearest in so-called general permit provisions.
For example, section 404 of the Clean Water Act provides that the
Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps),91 “may issue permits, after notice and opportunity
for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”92 In contrast to these
“individual permits,” section 404(e) establishes a general permit option
and the standards for its use as an alternative to case-by-case
individual permits offering vastly reduced paperwork, pre-approved
permit standards, and less direct regulatory oversight.93

91.
92.
93.

33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (2012).
Id. § 1344(a).
The statute reads:
(1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or fill material
under this section, the Secretary may, after notice of opportunity for public hearing,
issue general permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis for any category of
activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the Secretary determines
that the activities in such category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal
adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal
cumulative adverse effects on the environment. Any general permit issued under this
subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines described in subsection (b)(l) of this
section, and (B) set forth the requirements and standards which shall apply to any
activity authorized by such general permit.
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Over time the Corps has added more and more general permits
to the regulatory regime and has modified them to adapt to new
knowledge and changing circumstances, such that the vast majority of
permitting under section 404 now takes place through the Corps’
numerous general permits.94 The Corps has done this by design in order
to improve the opportunities for and clarity of Party Exit from
individual to general permitting as projects are designed to fit the
criteria for a general permit. As a congressional study of section 404
permits concluded, “[g]eneral permits, including nationwide permits,
are a key means by which the Corps seeks to minimize the burden and
delay of its regulatory program . . . .”95
Section 404 thus illustrates the exit design flexibility provided
to an agency through embedded exit tools. Congress did not have to
predict the various contexts in which individual permitting would be
overly burdensome; rather, it gave the tools to the agency to engage in
Adaptive Exit over time so it could create Mapped Exit (using objective
general permit criteria) and Uncertain Exit (using qualitative criteria)
mechanisms as the need arose. With over ninety percent of the demand
on the section 404 permit program handled under general permits
requiring a small amount of paperwork, or in some cases no paperwork,
and in a matter of weeks,96 this truly accomplishes regulatory exit. To
be sure, use of general permitting as an Adaptive Exit method must be
justified under specific regulatory program criteria and the general exit
metrics we developed above in Part II.B.—fast is not always better97—
but the point is to give the agency the flexibility at the front end rather
than handcuff it to a No Exit outcome.

(2) No general permit issued under this subsection shall be for a period of more than
five years after the date of its issuance and such general permit may be revoked or
modified by the Secretary if, after opportunity for public hearing, the Secretary
determines that the activities authorized by such general permit have an adverse
impact on the environment or such activities are more appropriately authorized by
individual permits.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1)–(2).
94. The Corps’ general permit program began in 1977 with the agency’s promulgation of five
general permits covering specified activities, such as utility line crossings and minor road
crossings. 42 Fed. Reg. 37121, 37146–47 (1977). Congress amended the CWA in 1977 after the
Corps promulgated this first set of general permits, essentially codifying the approach the Corps
took. See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water
Act: Where It Comes from, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 17 (2009).
95. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’
NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/97-223.pdf [http://perma.cc/4T74-FUR9].
96. See id.
97. For a comprehensive overview of general permitting and the programmatic and general
criteria for when it is appropriate, see generally Biber & Ruhl, supra note 15.
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Under our proposal, therefore, a similar general permit
authority, as well as standards for employing it, would be included in
all statutes creating permitting regimes, so that agencies can
periodically adjust (with justification) which actions receive the full
permitting treatment and which receive a lighter permitting review.
Similarly, statutes specifying regulatory thresholds would provide the
agency room to adjust them based on standards contained in the
statute, as the EPA attempted to do in its Tailoring Rule.98 Similar exit
design options could include authority to reduce monitoring, inspection,
and reporting for facilities proven to have achieved compliance over
time, authority to extend permit durations, adjusting the size of surety
bonds or other compliance assurance mechanisms, and authority to
implement trading and other market-based instruments in lieu of
comprehensive regulation. The point would be to equip the agency with
a menu of exit options it can implement after inception of the program
when it has sufficient experience with the program to make defensible
decisions about exit.
Consider, for example, how different the EPA’s experience in the
Chevron case would have been had such mechanisms been built into the
Clean Air Act.99 In Chevron, environmental groups challenged the
EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s mandate to regulate a
“stationary source” to allow bubbling––measuring the emissions of an
entire facility rather than regulating emissions from each individual
smokestack at the facility. Bubbling therefore allowed plants to avoid
regulatory requirements by increasing emissions from some sources
while reducing them at others.100 It took extensive litigation before this
policy was deemed legal.101
By contrast, had Congress designed the Clean Air Act to provide
the EPA the authority to, for example, “delineate stationary sources on
a general or case-by-case basis in a manner that increases costefficiency of compliance by a facility without increasing total pollutant
loads from the facility,” the EPA could have implemented the bubble
policy as easily as the Corps has designed its general permits. This
example of Lookback Exit would not have required Congress to predict
the bubble policy when it enacted the Clean Air Act. Once the EPA
gained the experience to see the advantages of bubbling, however, it

98. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2, 71.2 (2015).
99. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 125 (4th
ed. 2014).
101. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
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would have been able to design and apply the new exit strategy quickly.
Lookback Exit would have provided the EPA a general authority later
to employ in an applied context.
The second novel component of Lookback Exit is to require the
implementing agency at specified intervals to reopen the issue of exit,
either employing the tools of Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit or
justifying why not. Lookback Exit thus explicitly recognizes that at the
time of regulatory- or benefit-program inception both political reality
and information deficit may constrain the ability to design ex ante exit
strategies, but they commit agencies to work toward adoption of
Mapped Exit and Uncertain Exit models as the program evolves. It is,
in other words, a binding commitment to employ Adaptive Exit, but
does not limit the options to deregulation. For example, legislation
creating a new program would add a requirement that the
implementing agency engage in the deliberative exit review process we
outlined above in Part III by a particular date. The exit conditions
would not be fully specified at the inception of the regulatory program,
giving exit an ex post quality, but the timeline for explicitly considering
exit conditions and procedures would be mandatory. To be sure, this
proposal has the downside of placing demands on agency resources at a
time when budgets are tight across the government. It may be the case
that agencies more often than not would choose to maintain the status
quo. This process, however, would create the opportunity for more
deliberate consideration of exit strategies than the blunt measure of
eliminating rules and other forms of deregulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Legislatures and agencies work hard to address new policy
challenges, so it is understandable that thinking about exit from such
programs is not foremost on their minds at the time of creation. But exit
is an unavoidable consequence of any new government program. Every
threshold and standard inherently creates a universe of parties that are
“in” the program and others that are “out,” and very often it is possible
that parties will move between those two states. As a result, it is as
important to think clearly about exit in the administrative state as it is
to think clearly about the creation of new programs in the first place.
This Article has provided a framework for doing so.
The administrative state has relied too heavily on deregulation
and defunding as its default exit strategy. This Article is the first
attempt to create a framework for how to think about exit, helping to
explain its importance and guide its design. Through the example of
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fracking and our proposal of Lookback Exit, we have shown how
focusing on exit changes our analysis of regulatory design.
Exit, it turns out, is a big concept for the regulatory state. By
starting a dialogue and proposing a framework model, we believe new
questions come into focus for administrative law scholars. Key research
topics include, for example:
 How would a law and economics perspective model exit?
 How do exit strategies vary by institution, and are there
principles suggesting when exit is best determined by
legislatures, agencies, or courts?
 What is the feedback between entry and exit strategies?
 Which exit instruments should legislatures make available at
the front end for agencies to engage in Lookback Exit?
Exit is just as important to the administrative state as entry.
Questions such as these listed above provide fertile ground for research
and we trust this Article helps stimulate legal scholars to explore them
further.

